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Abstract
Lock-in is defined as the tendency to continue with an inefficient decision or project pro-
posal. The front-end phase is critical to project success, yet most studies have focused on 
lock-in in the implementation phase. Moreover, little is known about the way in which 
decision-makers perceive the risk of lock-in. In this paper we identify determinants of lock-
in in the front-end phase and we reveal decision-makers’ perceptions of risk of lock-in. Our 
findings show that risk attitudes towards lock-in vary with the level of risk aversion. How-
ever, this is not sufficiently acute to drive the level of regret needed to avoid lock-in. This 
implies that decision-makers do not accurately assess the risk of lock-in and as such their 
risk perceptions are a mediating factor in the formation of lock-in. Based on escalation of 
commitment, path dependency, and prospect theory, the main contribution lies in providing 
a more comprehensive understanding of lock-in in the front-end phase.
Keywords Lock-in · Escalation of commitment · Path dependency · Decision-making · 
Risk perception · Major transportation projects
Introduction
Governments worldwide are faced with the risk of significant cost overruns when deliver-
ing large infrastructure projects (e.g. Flyvbjerg et al. 2002; Odeck 2004; Love et al. 2016). 
The failure to deliver projects within budget is often attributed to problems in the front-end 
of projects (e.g. Williams et al. 2019), the decision-making and planning phase, where risks 
and uncertainty are often not adequately addressed (Williams and Samset 2010; Ramjerdi 
and Fearnely 2014). Recently, there has been an increase in studies focussing on front-end 
project planning, addressing for example stakeholders’ framing of project value (Martinsuo 
et al. 2019), project value through co-creation (Liu et al. 2019; Smyth et al. 2018), project 
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management flexibility (Jalali Sohi et  al. 2019), the risk of perverse incentives (Volden 
2019), and organisational support (Zwikael and Meredith 2019).
This paper also addresses this important front-end phase of transportation projects by 
focusing on lock-in, defined as the persistence with a project proposal even before the for-
mal decision to build has been taken (Cantarelli et al. 2010). With lock-in the real decision 
to build is often made before the formal decision to build, at a time when the estimated 
costs are typically much lower. Consequently, projects are approved that are unlikely to 
be completed within budget. Although not a formal commitment, in practice this lock-in 
causes irreversibility of the decision. This type of lock-in is similar to the cognitive lock-in 
studied in economic geography literature, whereby “actors inflexibly focus on a dominant 
path and common viewpoint” (Wood and Reynolds 2011: 2474).
There may be situations where it may be rational to commit to a specific project pro-
posal despite negative feedback on the plan. Tiwana et al. (2006) refer to this situation as 
warranted continuation. With warranted continuation it may be rational to continue even 
though the project plan itself is no longer economically viable, when one considers the 
value of other options and takes a wider portfolio and longer term perspective, where it 
may have strategic value to the organisation. The project may contribute to organisational 
objectives that would otherwise not be achieved. In case of warranted continuation, deci-
sion-makers make a conscious decision about the project plan and as such can still reverse 
the decision if desired. In contrast, this paper is interested in lock-in as a possible explana-
tion for project failures, it considers unwarranted continuation and irreversibility.
Two of the main explanations for this lock-in phenomenon proposed in the literature are 
escalation of commitment (e.g. Staw and Ross 1987; Brockner 1992) and (organisational) 
path dependence (e.g. Sydow et al. 2009; Vergne and Durand 2010; Schreyögg and Sydow 
2011). Escalation of commitment is defined as the “tendency for individuals to become 
overly committed to escalation situations” (Staw and Ross 1987: 41). Organisational path 
dependence is the process that produces persistence. It is defined as the process of increas-
ing reduction of choices that results in lock-in once a dominant decision is reinforced while 
other potentially more efficient decisions are excluded (Koch 2011).
Escalation of commitment focuses on what caused the escalation, while path depend-
ence focuses on how over time the project development process results in lock-in. Hence 
the theories are complementary (Sydow et  al. 2009; Koch 2011; Schreyögg and Sydow 
2011) and should be considered in conjunction to fully understand the lock-in phenomenon.
Most studies have focused on the drivers of lock-in in the implementation phase (e.g. 
Ross and Staw 1986, 1993; Maxwell et al. 1997; Drummond 1999; Winch 2013) such as 
overconfidence, sunk costs, perceived need for self-justification, denial, and completion 
effects (Drummond 2014). However, there is a need to “identify various factors that may 
operate during different stages of the project” (He and Mittal 2007: 236). So far little is 
known about factors that contribute to the emergence of lock-in in the front-end phase. 
The front-end is still often “unclear and poorly understood” (Williams et al. 2019: 4) and 
an increase in the understanding of “what goes on in the front-end” is needed. Moreover, 
the risk of lock-in and the resulting irreversibility of investment decisions is weakly under-
stood by policy makers (Ramjerdi and Fearnley 2014). A difference in decision-makers’ 
perception and assessment of risk (Keil et al. 2008) may be an explanation for why projects 
go awry (Wallance et al. 2004). However, little is known about the way in which decision-
makers perceive the risk of lock-in.
This paper aims to provide a more complete understanding of the risk of lock-in by 
expanding the current theoretical model of lock-in. It expands the model by including 
the front-end phase and perceived risk of lock-in to explain the formation of lock-in. Two 
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research objectives facilitate the achievement of this aim. First, to review the existing lit-
erature to identify determinants that contribute to the lock-in formation in the front-end 
phase. Second, to reveal different ways in which decision-makers perceive the risk of lock-
in in the front-end phase. Besides internal and external escalation and path dependency 
determinants, decision-makers’ attitude towards the risk of lock-in can affect the lock-in 
process and consequent project decision path. By using utility and prospect theory we pro-
pose a new dimension of perceived risk to the framework of lock-in.
Two research questions are considered. (1) Which escalation and path dependency 
determinants may contribute to lock-in in the front-end phase and how may they influence 
each other? (2) How do decision-makers perceive the risk of lock-in and what characterises 
and differentiates risk perceptions of lock-in in the front-end phase?
The paper is organised as follows. In section “Theoretical background to lock-in”, we 
discuss the theoretical background of lock-in covering escalation of commitment, organ-
isational path dependency, and risk perceptions. In section  “Research method”, we pre-
sent the research methodology and research context. The section “Analysis” provides the 
details and results of the analysis, while the “Findings” section presents the findings of the 
study including the derived perceptions. In section “Discussion and implications”, we dis-
cuss these findings and their implications and we suggest future research avenues. Lastly, 
in section “Conclusion” we present the conclusions of this study.
Theoretical background to lock‑in
This section sets out three theoretical explanations why lock-in may occur in the front-end 
phases of project development: escalation of commitment; path dependency; and utility 
theory.
Escalation of commitment
This section reviews the literature on escalation of commitment determinants. It aims to 
identify determinants that may result in lock-in in the front-end phase of projects.
Project determinants involve characteristics that affect the financial value of persisting 
with a project or withdrawing from it. Project determinants include decision risk (inherent 
uncertainty regarding the likelihood of incurring a loss) and positive performance trend 
information (the presence of an increasing, but still low, probability of success) (Sleesman 
et al. 2012). These determinants have the strongest effect in the intermediate phases (when 
the project is about half complete) whereas their effect on escalation of commitment in the 
early planning phases is relatively low (He and Mittal 2007).
In contrast, three determinants that are particularly influential in the emergence of 
lock-in in the front-end phase as compared to the later phases include information quality, 
opportunity costs, and expressed preference. The project planning phase is often charac-
terised by high levels of uncertainty. As a result decision-makers tend to delay withdrawal 
because they prefer to wait until more information becomes available to make a persistence 
or withdrawal decision (Bragger et  al. 1998). Opportunity costs provide decision-mak-
ers with information about the costs foregone by continuing with a specific project plan. 
Opportunity costs are the costs representing the missed benefits of alternative projects that 
could have been financed. Providing decision-makers with information about these oppor-
tunity costs could influence their decision (Northcraft and Neal 1986). Decision-makers 
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who consider these opportunity costs in an explicit manner are less likely to escalate their 
commitment and become locked-in to the decision (Northcraft and Neale 1986; Harvey 
and Victoravich 2009).
A related concept concerns the expressed preference for initial decisions. This implies 
that decision-makers will invest more resources if they prefer the project proposal (Schulz-
Hardt et  al. 2009). Expressed preference can be considered a driver for project approval 
and contribute to the formation of lock-in in the planning phase while it can be considered 
a driver for project completion in the implementation phase.
Turning to psychological determinants, the two main determinants are the need for self-
justification and previous resource expenditures (sunk costs) (Sleesman et al. 2012). With 
self-justification, individuals will spend more resources because they feel the need to show 
their initial decision was correct (Brockner 1992). Self-justification can explain how deci-
sion-makers persist with a project decision after the real decision to build is taken (infor-
mal decision) and why they are unlikely to withdraw the project decision at the later stage 
of formal decision to build.
The influence of sunk costs on escalation of commitment is widely acknowledged in the 
literature (e.g. Brockner 1992; Keil et al. 1995). Decision-makers typically do not want to 
be seen wasting resources, and therefore try to justify their decisions by increasing their 
commitment to it (Arkes and Blumer 1985). Schwenk and Tang (1989) also referred to 
this as retrospective rationality, decision-makers bias their attitudes towards the decision 
they have made to justify their behaviour. This determinant is typically considered in the 
implementation phase when large investments have been made. However, due to the long 
decision-making nature of major projects, time and effort can also be considered sunk costs 
contributing to the formation of lock-in in the front-end phase. Decision-makers do not 
want to admit that the time they have invested had been a waste (Soman 2001).
Social determinants can be considered as an external need for justification. The project 
context may lead to decision-makers’ desire to be seen to behave in a consistent manner 
which could result in lock-in. For example, a minister may prefer to stick to previously 
expressed political preference (i.e. to support a project proposal) because they do not want 
to lose credibility or be accused of inconsistent behaviour (e.g. Cayton 2017). The degree 
of initial public commitment and the extent to which public statements include references 
about the wisdom of an initial decision are factors that relate to increased persistence 
(Schwenk and Tang 1989). Decision-makers who are facing high pressures from stakehold-
ers are more likely to persist in order to manage the impressions others have of them and to 
save face (e.g. Brockner et al. 1981). A second social determinant that can result in lock-in 
in the front-end phase is resistance. Major projects are often subject to public scrutiny and 
outside evaluations. The relative level of initial resistance to the decision influences the 
degree of persistence (Schwenk and Tang 1989). In the implementation phase, criticism 
is mostly directed at performance measures such as cost and schedule. In contrast, in the 
planning phase resistance is mostly directed towards the project proposal, whereby deci-
sion-makers feel the need to justify the project decision and hence risk becoming locked-in.
Lastly, structural determinants are defined by Staw and Ross (1987: 60) as “the struc-
tural features of an organisation and its interaction patterns”. In the implementation phase 
this concerns determinants such as administrative inertia or institutionalisation; projects 
that are embedded in or tied to an organisation’s core values are less likely to be halted. In 
contrast, one of the main structural determinants in the decision-making phase concerns 
political influences. If a project plan does no longer appear to be feasible on economic 
grounds, political support may lead to persistence with a project proposal. It may prevent 
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re-examination of the project decision or the project evaluation may be positively biased 
(Staw and Ross 1987).
Path dependence
For the study of (major) projects, path dependence may occur at the micro level (Vergne 
and Durand 2010) and is often referred to as organisational path dependence (Sydow 
et al. 2009; Schreyögg and Sydow 2011). Organisational path dependence is the process 
of “an increasing reduction in a range of choices at the level of organisational resources 
and capabilities” (Koch 2011: 340). When positive feedback about a project proposal 
is received, this process of reducing options may be desired as it may increase the effi-
ciency of organisational processes. However, such reduction of options becomes a prob-
lem when it is the result of the tapering feature of organisational path dependence. In 
those cases project choices become increasingly restricted in the process of following a 
path (Koch 2011). It then results in one dominant project proposal being reinforced over 
time excluding other potential more efficient project plans.
The process of organisational path dependence consists of three stages (Sydow et al. 
2009; Koch 2011). In the first stage of preformation, some initial conditions are set, but 
there is still a broad scope of action with multiple choices available. When an initial 
decision is made, the process moves on to the second stage of formation. In this stage, 
the range of options is reduced to the extent that alternatives are barely considered. 
The third stage of lock-in emerges when the process has become irreversible through 
increasing returns. For example, the costs of deviating from a decision path has become 
so large, that changing the course of action is no longer an option (Sydow et al. 2009).
Except for two case studies by Hellström et  al. (2013) and Aaltonen et  al. (2017) 
there are surprisingly few studies that consider organisational path dependence at the 
project level. There seems to be a lack of knowledge on how events during the early 
stages of major projects follow a path dependent process and may result in lock-in.
One of the main determinants of organisational path dependence in the context of 
major projects is the closure of project alternatives. The closure of alternatives could 
be the result of adaptive expectation effects (Sydow et al. 2009; Schreyögg and Sydow 
2011). These are self-reinforcing mechanisms that strengthen path formation when, 
in situations of high levels of uncertainty, decision-makers are more sensitive to relying 
on decisions and project proposals that seem to be preferred by others (Aaltonen et al. 
2017).
Agreements and decision support are two other organisational path dependence 
determinants that may act as self-reinforcing mechanisms in the planning phase (Can-
tarelli et al. 2010). Agreements can formalise commitment to decisions even before the 
actual go-decision has been made, because it implies an expectation of stakeholders to 
adopt and support specific arrangements. Decision support refers here to the support 
for the real (informal) decision to build, thus the decision before the formal decision 
to build is taken. Decision-makers are informally committed if they support the project 
decision even if new information about the project plan becomes available that shows 
the project is no longer feasible. In principle it could still be possible to reverse the 
project decision. However, decision support explains why in practice decision-makers 
do not deviate from the path and change their decision at the moment of formal deci-
sion to build. So far only a few studies have explored the link between decision support 
and lock-in. They confirmed decision support increases the risk of lock-in either by the 
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tendency to bias results in favour of the supported project proposal (Tal and Cohen-
Blankshtain 2011) or by trying to keep on a decision path and avoid termination (Guler 
2007).
Conceptual model
Figure 1 shows how the formation of lock-in in the front-end phase of major projects may take 
place by the escalation of commitment and path dependency determinants revealed above. 
Over time, different determinants play a role that contribute to the lock-in formation, for exam-
ple, in the early phases it is typically project determinants (Staw and Ross 1987). The funnel 
shows how organisational path dependency gradually occurs over time due to different deter-
minants leading to a reduction of the solution space (Koch 2011).
This study investigates to what extent this risk of lock-in as presented in Fig. 1 is perceived 
as such by decision-makers.
Figure 2 shows the relation between escalation and path dependency determinants.
Decision support, expressed preference, and political support can result in making agree-
ments or closing project alternatives. These two path dependency determinants can conse-
quently lead to decision-maker’s desire to justify their decision, to themselves (self) or to oth-
ers (external).
Agreements could also contribute to the sunk cost effect and consequently result in clo-
sure of alternatives. Decision support has an indirect relation with the escalation determinants 











































Fig. 1  Lock-in process in the front-end phase (based on Staw and Ross 1987; Sydow et al. 2009)
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The relationships between different escalation determinants are few. Where literature has 
discussed potential relations (Sleesman et al. 2012), these are between variables that have not 
been part of our study because they do not apply in the front-end phase.
Utility theory and risk perception
Whilst there are examples in the literature around utility, escalation of commitment, 
and path dependence, these often focus on the impact of one particular determinant. 
For instance, some studies used expected subjective utility theory to explain a specific 
project determinant of escalation of commitment (e.g. Kahneman and Tversky 1979; 
Bragger et  al. 1998; Schulz-Hardt et  al. 2009). However, there have been few studies 
which have considered theories in a holistic way, and explicitly considered how and why 
different decision-makers with different attitudes to risk might have different attitudes or 
responses to lock-in. The previous section has illustrated the escalation of commitment 
and path dependency theories. In this section we use prospect theory to reveal percep-
tions of risk caused by these escalation and path dependency determinants of lock-in.
Prospect theory states that “people underweight outcomes that are merely probable 
in comparison with outcomes that are obtained with certainty” (Kahneman and Tversky 
1979: 265), resulting in risk seeking behaviour when choices involve a sure loss. When 
decision-makers receive negative feedback about a project plan, the decision to be made 
is one between abandoning the project plan or continuing with the project proposal. 
Decision-makers would perceive the decision to abandon the project as a sure loss 
which results in risk-seeking behaviour and induces escalation of commitment behav-
iour (Drummond 1996; Keil et al. 2000). This shows how the perceived risk of lock-in 
may shape decision-makers risk preferences. In other words, if the risk of lock-in is not 
acknowledged, persisting with the project despite negative feedback is not considered a 
loss because decision-makers hope to turn the situation around and achieve a positive 
outcome.
The risk-averse decision-maker will perceive the risk of lock-in to be higher than a 
risk-seeking decision-maker. With options through alternative project pathways dimin-
ishing due to the various determinants previously discussed, they would anticipate 
regret over continuing with the project decision (Ku 2008; Wong and Kwong 2007). 
They will adopt a strategy of minimising the maximum regret they anticipate (‘minimax 
regret strategies’) (Savage 1951), whereas risk seeking decision-makers do not antici-
pate such regret increasing their commitment and lock-in. Clearly, two decision-makers 




with different attitudes to risk and thus different minimax regret strategies will have 
quite different attitudes to the risk of lock-in.
There is some useful extant planning literature but none which utilises this to 
explain the role of different attitudes on this lock-in outcome. Su and Tung (2012) refer 
to opportunity loss in complex projects to help understand alternative project rankings, 
but do not explicitly refer to outcomes under lock-in to any one alternative. Hung and 
Ryu (2008) argue that the decision-maker’s risk preference is path dependent but apply 
this to the field of supply chain management and inventory decisions. Several stud-
ies have also used or reviewed regret theory and specifically the minimax criterion to 
examine location decisions (e.g. Li et al. 2018; Wang et al. 2008) but, these have been 
in a decision support context rather than looking at the extent to which those location 
decisions became irreversible because of lock-in.
In the next section we will outline the research method to reveal decision-makers’ 
perceived risk of lock-in.
Research method
Rationale of Q‑methodology
This study is concerned with decision-makers’ perceptions of the risk of lock-in. Par-
ticularly we aim to reveal patterns of perceptions and describe the characteristics of 
these patterns and their differences.
The study of people’s perceptions is subjective and complex. In addition, the risk 
perceptions that we aim to reveal in this study typically encompass a complex and 
dynamic interplay of escalation and path dependency determinants. Moreover, percep-
tions may not be clearly defined a priori by the researcher or readily articulated by 
research participants. Therefore, in order to answer our research questions, a method-
ology is required that can investigate subjectivity in an unbiased way, can deal with the 
complex interplay of factors, and can reveal patterns of risk perceptions.
Q-methodology (described in the next sections) was selected because it meets these 
requirements. The method was adopted in this research for the following reasons. First, 
the method is particularly suitable for the systematic study of subjectivity, that is peo-
ples’ perceptions and beliefs, by providing procedures to reveal and examine various 
viewpoints (Brown 1993). Second, the method provides a way to deal with the inter-
play of variables. With Q-methodology participants evaluate and interpret statements 
in relation with each other providing a means to reveal wider risk perceptions. This is 
not possible with typical survey methods, whereby statements are considered in isola-
tion. Third, Q-methodology generates diverse patterns of perceptions that are not eas-
ily characterised by predefined attitudes. As such it can reveal the complex and unde-
fined risk perceptions of lock-in. Fourth, Q-methodology is particularly suitable for 
small sample sizes. It is less influenced by low response rates (Brown 1980, 1993; 
McKeown and Thomas 1988) and it does not bias results or the reliability of the results 
(Brown 1993; Valenta and Wigger 1997: 501). This study is prone to have a small 
sample size due to the limited number of decision-makers with in-depth knowledge 
and active involvement in the decision-making of a major project. In the sections that 




Q-methodology is a hybrid qualitative-quantitative approach originally developed by 
William Stephenson as a means to investigate subjective viewpoints (Brown 1986, 
1993). In this method, the participants are the variables, compared to traits or items 
in conventional factor analysis. Participants are asked to rank items within a subject 
domain, after which the participants’ item configurations (or rank orderings) are inter-
correlated and factor analysed. The resulting factors represent the shared viewpoints. Q 
operates on the assumption of ‘finite diversity’, i.e. there is a limited number of view-
points within a subject domain. Q works on this assumption and attempts to reveal those 
viewpoints in a structured and interpretable manner (Barry and Proops 1999: 339).
Q‑methodology approach
The first stage in Q-methodology involves defining the concourse from which the sam-
ple of statements is drawn. The concourse is the flow of communicability surrounding any 
topic (Brown 1993). From the concourse, a set of statements (called Q-sample) is gener-
ated that is representative of the range of existing opinions about the topic.
In the second stage participants receive a randomly numbered set of statements from the 
Q-sample. They are asked to rank order these statements on a score sheet (agree to disa-
gree) (see Fig. 3) according to their beliefs.
The score sheet is represented as a distribution with the blank cells indicating where 
statements should be placed along the continuum, thus indicating the number of statements 
participants can rank for a certain value of the distribution. For example, the distribution 
allows for the ranking of two statements as agree most (score of 3), three statements as 
agree (score of 2), and three statements as slightly agree (score of 1). In Q-methodology 
these categories are represented by numeric values indicating the extent of (dis)agreement. 
With seven categories this results in ranking values from − 3 (disagree most) to + 3 (agree 
most). The resulting rank-ordering is referred to as Q-sort, it is the viewpoint of that indi-
vidual. Participants are given the opportunity to provide additional comments on the state-
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Fig. 3  Score sheet for Q-sorting 20 statements
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In the third and last stage, the Q-sorts are correlated and factor-analysed. Correlation 
analysis is used to identify which respondents share similar viewpoints. Persons whose 
Q-sorts correlate share certain perceptions. Stephenson (1935: 21) explains “if each indi-
vidual has his or her own specific likes and dislikes, then the individuals will not correlate 
except by chance alone.” Thus in Q-methodology participants (based on their Q-sorts) are 
correlated whereas in traditional factor analysis traits (such as experience, age) are cor-
related.1 Stephenson (1935: 2) continues “if significant correlations appear, they could be 
factorised.” The objective of the factor analysis is to obtain the groupings of data arrays 
(numerical data of the Q-sorts) that are highly correlated. The factors that are extracted 
represent the common perceptions. Factor loadings indicate the extent to which people are 
associated with a specific factor (viewpoint) (Valenta and Wigger 1997). Individuals with 
similar views on the topic would then share the same factor.
In order to describe the identified factors (viewpoints), factor scores are converted into 
an array of scores corresponding to those used in the original Q-sort continuum to compute 
the ideal type Q-sort for that factor. An idealised Q-sort represents how a hypothetical per-
son with a 100 percent loading on the factor would have ordered the statements.
Case study
We adopted a case study approach to gain an in-depth understanding of the complex phe-
nomenon of lock-in. The exploratory nature of our study into decision-makers’ perceptions 
fits well with this qualitative method. Moreover, the value of a case study lies in “its abil-
ity to encompass a wide range of variables” (Drummond 1996: 24) making it a suitable 
method for our research which includes a variety of escalation of commitment and path 
dependency variables.
Phenomena on major projects are contextually specific (Winch 2013). We have there-
fore selected a single case study because single case studies are especially suitable to gain 
a deep understanding of the context. In fact, many empirical case studies on escalation of 
commitment are single case studies (e.g. Expo 86 World Fair and the Shoreham Nuclear 
Power Plant (Ross and Staw 1986, 1993), Taurus (Drummond 1996, 1999), Great Whale 
hydroelectric complex (Maxwell et al. 1997) and the Channel Fixed Link (Winch 2013)). 
The context-dependent knowledge and explorative insights that can be gained from a single 
case are highly valuable (Flyvbjerg 2006).
To explore the perceptions of the risk of lock-in, we need to understand the context 
specificity of lock-in. Thus, in selecting a case, a project should have evidence of lock-in 
and it needs to be well documented to trace the lock-in formation. The Betuweroute project 
(see next section) meets both of these criteria. Several academic papers as well as semi-
annual project progress reports and governmental reports by the Temporary Committee for 
Infrastructure Projects (TCI 2004) are publicly available. This approach is similar to the 
‘revelatory’ case selection from Yin (2014) whereby a case represents an opportunity to 
study a phenomenon that is otherwise inaccessible or undisclosed. In the next section, we 
present the key events in the decision-making of the Betuweroute project.
1 This inversion of conventional factor analyses also let to naming the technique as ‘Q’, to make a distinc-




The Betuweroute is a freight-transport railway line of about 160 km between the port of 
Rotterdam in the Netherlands and the European hinterland. It was opened in 2007 after 
a long decision-making process. As long ago as the early 1980s, various proposals were 
drawn to construct a new railway line. It was aimed to improve the connection between the 
‘main port’ Rotterdam and the European hinterland while at the same time strengthening 
the national economy (Priemus 2007).
In 1990 the Betuweroute project proposal was included in the SVV2 (Second Transport 
and Structure Plan), as a solution to the problem of insufficient railway capacity for freight 
transport to accommodate expected future growth. The SVV2 is a policy plan for the devel-
opment of transport in the Netherlands (Priemus 2007; TCI 2004), it is not legally binding. 
The Ministry of Transport and the Dutch Railway Company (NS) decided to investigate 
this project proposal in more detail, with the NS investigating the specific implementa-
tion of the Betuweroute in a project memorandum (Ministry of Transport 1996–2007; TCI 
2004).
Concerns about the possible negative impacts of the Betuweroute increased and various 
pressure groups including a national body were initiated. At the same time, the steering 
committee of the Betuweroute project considered the need to accelerate the decision-mak-
ing on the project.
The Betuweroute project proposal was subject to heavy criticism, with economic viabil-
ity and landscape issues (due to the proposed project crossing a nature area) being heavily 
debated (TCI 2004; Roscam et al. 1999). There was also a lot of resistance because of the 
environmental worries about noise and dangerous chemical spills. Another major contro-
versy concerned project alternatives. Alternative rail project plans such as a joint hinter-
land connection by rail between Rotterdam and Antwerp, increased utilisation of the exist-
ing railway network, and underground construction, were not taken seriously or considered 
too late in the process to make an impact on the decision to proceed with the Betuweroute 
project proposal (Priemus 2007). Projects to improve this hinterland connection focusing 
on other modes such as inland water transport were never considered fair alternatives either 
(Priemus 2007).
In 1992 the Cabinet decided to follow the PKB1 procedure (Key Planning Decision, 
part I) for the project, which details part of national policy. They pursued a two-track pol-
icy; calling for the publication of the policy plans (PKB1) while at the same time conduct-
ing additional research to justify the project plan. Besides the PKB1 procedure, two new 
pieces of legislation (the New Track and NIMBY laws) were planned to prevent further 
delay to projects or, in other words, to speed up the decision-making process (Priemus and 
Visser 1995).
In 1993 the so-called Warnemünde agreement was signed, an agreement with Germany 
to provide a connection with the German rail network. Under this agreement, the Nether-
lands were to undertake several activities, amongst others the construction of the Betuw-
eroute project and the construction and expansion to the German border (Priemus 2007).
In 1996 finally after a long decision-making process the formal decision to build the 




We followed guidelines on Q-methodology to address research validity (Valenta and Wig-
ger 1997). Content validity was ensured by conducting a thorough literature review and 
documentation search on the phenomenon of lock-in and the decision-making of the Betu-
weroute project. The use of this type of material also ensures face validity in the formation 
of the statements; statements are not affected by the wording of participants. The post-sort-
ing opportunity to comment and elaborate on their sorting showed that participants fully 
comprehended the task and contents. It did not reveal any dissatisfaction by participants, 
which is an indication of the validity of the results in Q-studies (Tielen et al. 2008). Besides 
content and face validity, issues of validity “fade” in Q-methodology (Brown 1993; Dziopa 
and Ahern 2011). This is because the Q-sorting procedure is used to assess individual’s 




As the first step in a Q-study we defined the concourse and developed the Q-sample. In our 
research, the concourse is the decision-making of the Betuweroute project and how escala-
tion of commitment and path dependency determinants contributed to lock-in. We used a 
hybrid method of concourse development combining items that emerged from scientific lit-
erature on lock-in and items that emerged from documentation about the Betuweroute pro-
ject. This section describes the concourse and identifies the determinants that contributed 
to lock-in in the decision-making of the Betuweroute project. We developed the Q-sample 
by generating statements from this concourse.
Even before the formal decision to build was taken in 1996 various events took place 
that may have contributed to lock-in. As explained in the previous section, early on in the 
decision-making the focus was solely on railway connections as an opportunity to develop 
Rotterdam harbour (Priemus 2007; TCI 2004). This created an excessive focus on the 
Betuweroute project itself and shifted attention away from the problems with insufficient 
railway capacity for freight transport. Studies by TCI (2004) and Priemus (2007) argue 
that the phenomenon of “solutions searching for problems” played an important role in the 
decision-making of the Betuweroute. The excessive focus on the Betuweroute illustrates 
the expressed preference determinant. In an interview with the Gelderlander, the Chair-
man of the commission on the Betuweroute confirmed that the decision for the project was 
already taken and that arguments to support the project plan were only provided later on in 
the decision-making process (De Gelderlander 1995 in Roscam et al. 1999: 13).
As a response to the heavy criticism on the project proposal, rather than evaluating and 
examining the facts and figures of the Betuweroute, the Cabinet focused on justifying its 
decision of principle (i.e. the decision to continue with the Betuweroute project plan) (TCI 
2004) (resistance determinant). For example, any investigations were to be based on the 
demand forecasts provided by the NS, and as these were highly positive, it resulted in sub-
sequent studies also showing a positive evaluation and thus providing a justification for the 
Betuweroute decision. Roscam et al. (1999: 10) refers to reports that seemed to have been 
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written according to desired messages and a Government who does not want to engage in 
any discussions but who wants to enforce a decision that represents a “point of no return”.
Pestman (1999) introduces the “mobilisation paradox”: the social controversies in the 
project led to new knowledge, facts, and circumstances, however, due to the controversy 
and political viewpoints, these became less accepted by those responsible, consequently 
reducing the probability of deviating from the Betuweroute decision path. The influence 
of resistance is also aptly illustrated by Pestman (1999: 206): “…it becomes increasingly 
difficult for politicians to change their opinions because of their fear of losing credibility” 
illustrating the external justification determinant.
On several occasions the Cabinet appeared biased towards the Betuweroute decision, 
with important ministers being supporters of the project plan (TCI 2004), illustrating the 
presence of the political support determinant. As new information on project plans became 
available from both project opponents and proponents, they were not critically evaluated. 
For example when Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (TCI 2004: 194) 
concluded that the freight capacity was higher than expected allowing for phased imple-
mentation, this was not being considered. In face of contradictory information, the Cabi-
net always let positive interpretation prevail (TCI 2004). By portraying the situation in a 
positive manner, the risk of the plan reduces, increasing the probability of decision-mak-
ers staying with a decision path (Schoorman et al. 1994). This shows the self-justification 
determinant of lock-in by information framing. However, the Minister at the time did not 
share this view of optimistic presentation of the project by the Cabinet (TCI 2004).
Throughout the planning phase the arguments in favour of the Betuweroute project 
remained poorly founded. Information acquisition generally reduces the tendency to esca-
late commitment (Bowen 1987; Bragger et al. 2003), conversely, a lack of information may 
contribute to lock-in formation. The available information was not sufficient to take a justi-
fied decision and this was used as a reason to delay the withdrawal decision. The fact that 
environmental and economic objectives had not been met proved no reason to revise the 
project decision (Ministry of Transport 1996–2007; TCI 2004). Instead decision-makers 
tried to justify their decision by insisting it was a “strategic decision” (Roscam et al. 1999). 
It was said to be essential to meet economic and environmental interests (TCI 2004). More-
over, the project was believed to be necessary to achieve long-term policy goals such as 
strengthening the image of the Harbour of Rotterdam and the position of the Netherlands in 
the European distribution network (Pestman 1999).
The long decision-making phase may have enforced the sunk cost effect; time and effort 
spent on the decision-making of the project did not want to be seen as having been wasted. 
The Cabinet pressured the parliament by referring to the time spent on the decision-making 
and that postponing the decision-making was not desired (TCI 2004).
The government introduced new legislation and procedures to speed up the decision-
making on the Betuweroute. The two-track policy that was adopted may have contributed 
to the lock-in result. It allowed decision-makers to continue with the project plan and even 
take some first steps into implementation making it harder to reverse the decision-mak-
ing process (TCI 2004). Indeed, it was anticipated that this would reduce possibilities to 
reverse the project decision but it turned out this was in fact the intended outcome (TCI 
2004: 399). This is a clear example how the Cabinet’s support strategically acted to keep 
the project plan from being withdrawn.
A poor problem analysis, as well as actions by the Ministry and the NS led to alterna-
tives not being fairly evaluated, effectively closing alternatives to the Betuweroute project 
from the decision-making process. The Warnemünde agreement as well as the SVV2 were 
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made before the formal decision to build was taken, narrowing the decision-making pro-
cess to the Betuweroute decision path and as such contributing to lock-in formation.
To conclude, all escalation and path dependency determinants of lock-in in the front-
end phase were present except for the determinant opportunity cost information. It was not 
so much the unavailability of information on alternatives that contributed to lock-in in the 
Betuweroute project, but rather the insufficient consideration of alternatives.
A set of statements were generated that represent the relevant determinants that were 
identified. In addition, statements related to reversibility of the decision were included to 
determine decision-makers’ level of awareness of lock-in. The statements are presented in 
Table 3 in “Appendix 1” showing how the statements relate to the (category of) determi-
nant. For example for the category project determinants, statements were generated cover-
ing the two determinants expressed preference and information quality.
Participants and data collection
Participants in this study involve (former) politicians, both members of the coalition and 
opposition parties at the time of the Betuweroute project. This concerns a total of 244 
members, and based on availability of contact information, 154 members were asked to 
participate in the study.
The data were collected by means of an online web-application (FlashQ developed by 
Hackert and Braehler 2007). Participants received a randomly numbered set of statements. 
They were provided with a score sheet (see “Q-methodology approach” section), and par-
ticipants were asked to rank-order the statements according to the extent to which they 
agreed/disagreed with the statements. The resulting rank-orderings (Q-sorts) are the view-
points of individuals. They represent the way decision-makers perceive the risk of lock-in 
and how they attribute certain determinants to the formation of lock-in.
Only few members were closely involved in the decision-making of the project and 
were therefore able to participate in the study. The politically sensitive subject and people’s 
unfamiliarity with the method may have led to some reluctance to participate. However, 
the sample size of our study of 15 respondents is similar to that of many other external 
Q-studies (e.g. Bullington et al. 2007; Hall 2008; Lai et al. 2007; Steelman and Maguire 
1999). Besides, the factors derived in our study were highly distinguishable indicating the 
reliability of the results. As mentioned in the “Research method” section, Q-methodology 
is a reliable method for small sample studies. The primary purpose of Q-methodology is 
to identify a typology of perceptions, not to test the percentage of people that share these 
perceptions. Hence, the number of respondents is rendered relatively unimportant. “As few 
as 12 participants can generate statistically meaningful results” (Barry and Proops 1999: 
344); the resulting typologies of viewpoints are statistically significantly different from one 
another. Therefore, the response rate is acceptable for this exploratory study.
Correlation and factor analysis
After participants completed the Q-sorting process, we proceeded with the data analysis 
using PQMethod software (Schmolck 2002). This is a dedicated Q-methodology software 
package that automatically generates the initial by-person correlation matrix and pro-
vides effective processes for factor analysis. First, a by-person correlation procedure was 
followed in which participants’ Q-sorts were correlated. The correlation matrix indicates 
the relationships between Q-sorts (Watts and Stenner 2005). Subsequently, the resulting 
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person/Q-sort correlation matrix was factor analysed by Principle Components Factor 
Analysis. Factor analysis produced a set of factors onto which participants load. The fac-
tors are based on the way in which participants rank ordered the statements. Participants 
that load onto the same factor will have created similar rank orderings. The factors repre-
sent the common perceptions of the risk of lock-in. Initially eight factors were extracted. 
These factors were subjected to Varimax rotation to identify significant, orthogonal (uncor-
related) factors. By convention, only factors with an eigenvalue greater than or equal to 
1 and with two or more significant loadings are considered significant.2 Eigenvalue is a 
common statistical criterion used in Q-methodology to decide which factors to retain. Any 
factors with lower eigenvalues than 1 are not considered significant, they may result largely 
from chance and therefore should be disregarded (Addams 2000: 27). The varimax rotation 
identified four significant factors (referred to below as factors A–D).
For these remaining four factors, a factor loading was determined for each Q-sort, 
expressing the extent to which each Q-sort is associated with each factor. Persons with 
loadings in excess of 2.58 (1/√N) (with N = the number of statements) are considered sta-
tistically significant at the conventional p = 0.01 level (McKeown and Thomas 1988: 50). 
Significant loadings are thus ‘indicative of a meaningful relationship between the partici-
pant’s Q-sort and the factor type’ (Addams 2000: 25). In this study, loadings in excess 
of ± 0.58 are significant at the p = 0.01 level (see Table 1).3
Table 1 shows the loadings for each Q-sort on each of the four factors. The Q-sort ID’s 
are participants’ rank ordering of statements. For example, Q-Sort 1 is correlated with fac-
tor A to the extent of 0.54 whereas Q-sort 2 is correlated on factor A to the extent of 0.40, 
their loadings are − 0.21 and 0.41 respectively on factor B. None of these are significant 
factor loadings as they do not meet the threshold value of ± 0.58. Instead both Q-sort 1 and 
2 have a significant factor loading on factor D. Thus participants 1 and 2 rank ordered the 
statements in a similar way, they have similar viewpoints that can be represented by factor 
D.
Factors A–D are four distinct ways in which decision-makers perceive the risk of lock-
in. The factor matrix thus reveals convergence and divergence of perceptions. Participants 
loading on a factor have similar viewpoints but their viewpoints differ from participants 
who have loaded on any of the other factors.
Factors however do not give us information about the perceptions they represent. In 
order to describe these four perceptions of risk we computed the ideal type Q-sorts. The 
Q-sorts of all participants that load on a factor were merged to determine this single ideal 
Q-sort (Watts and Stenner 2005). The idealised Q-sort is also referred to as ‘factor array’, 
it represents the best-estimate of the ordering of the statements for that factor. As such this 
ordering reveals strong (dis)agreements of statements and overall perception on the topic.
We determined the ideal type Q-sort by converting the factor scores into an array of 
scores corresponding to those used in the original Q-sort continuum, a range from − 3 (dis-
agree most) to + 3 (agree most). Table 2 shows these factor arrays for factors A–D. It shows 
the scores for each of the statements on the four factors (A–D). The table also shows the 
2 An eigenvalue is a measure that reflects the amount of variation accounted for by the corresponding fac-
tor. Although a variety of statistical criteria may be used to decide which factors are to be retained as ‘real’ 
and significant, the eigenvalue criterion is the most widely used rule (Addams 2000).
3 Persons with loadings in excess of 1.96 (1/√N) (with N = number of statements) are considered statisti-
cally significant at the p = 0.05 level. Q sort 7 loaded 0.525 on factor 2 which is significant at the p = 0.05 
level but not at the p = 0.01 level.
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relation between the statement, the category of determinant, and the specific determinant it 
refers to. The category of determinant refers to the categories of escalation of commitment, 
organisational path dependency, or awareness. For example, participants who share the risk 
perception represented by factor C strongly agree with statement 1 (it has a score of + 3) 
whereas participants who share factor B do not have a strong opinion about this statement 
(score of 0). Figure 5 in “Appendix 2” illustrates the idealized Q-sort for factor A in the 
score sheet format.
Findings
The previous section has identified four factors and their factor arrays. These represent the 
four different ways in which decision-makers perceive the risk of lock-in. In this section 
we describe these perceptions referring to the statement number and factor arrays as (state-
ment number: score). For example reference to (1:3) means statement 1 has a score of 3; 
participants that share this risk perception strongly agree with statement 1.
Table 1  Factor matrix
X Indicates that the Q-sort loaded significantly on the factor (A–D 
respectively). For example both participants 1 and 2 share perception 
D, whereas the perception of participant 3 is represented by percep-
tion B
a Following the notation by Watts and Stenner (2014), each participant 
has a code next to their ID representing the demographic and sup-
porting information relevant for this study. The code for participant 
1 is MC/O9. In order of appearance, information is provided about 
gender (M = male), political party (in this case both as C = coalition, 
O = opposition party), and years of experience (9 years)
Q-sort  IDa A B C D
1. MC/O9 0.54  − 0.21  − 0.14 0.64 X
2. FC8 0.40 0.41 0.03 0.65 X
3. MC9  − 0.04 0.73 X 0.31 0.28
4. MO8 0.09 0.04 0.05 0.90 X
5. FC1  − 0.04  − 0.33  − 0.77 X 0.02
6. MC9  − 0.03  − 0.00 0.82 X 0.07
7. MC13  − 0.30 0.53 X 0.41 0.03
8. M-13  − 0.46 0.80 X 0.08 0.01
9. MO9 0.86 X  − 0.11  − 0.15 0.16
10. FC14 0.88 X  − 0.24 0.02 0.24
11. MC5 0.38  − 0.73 X 0.01 0.40
12. MO13  − 0.20 0.76 X 0.16  − 0.26
13. MC8 0.74 X  − 0.00 0.11 0.40
14. MC9 0.40 0.80 X 0.01 0.01
15. MO9 0.32  − 0.31 0.10 0.75 X









Table 2  Factor arrays of four rotated factors
Nos. Statement Category of determinant Determinant Factor
A B C D
1 In 1996, the decision to build was taken, but informally, one or more political parties 
had already committed themselves to the project
Awareness Recognition 2 0 3 1
2 Although the decision was not yet taken formally, the immense amount of time put in 
the project before 1996 made it impossible not to proceed with the project
Psychological Sunk costs − 1 − 2 0 − 2
3 In their position towards the Betuweroute, some politicians put their personal interest 
before social or economic interests
Social External justification 0 − 3 − 2 0
4 The commitment to implement the Betuweroute increased by including the project in 
the policy plan SVV2
Project Expressed preference 1 1 2 0
5 I felt like alternatives for the Betuweroute (for example inland shipping) could not be 
discussed
Organisational path dependence Closure of alternatives 3 − 1 − 3 3
6 In 1996 the decision to build was taken, but I felt committed to the project much 
earlier
Awareness Recognition − 2 1 0 0
7 Even before the formal decision to build was taken in 1996, investments (for example 
for research) were too large to blow off the project
Psychological Sunk costs 0 − 2 2 − 1
8 I would have taken it personally if the decision to build Betuweroute project had not 
passed
Psychological Internal justification − 3 0 − 3 − 2
9 The commitment to implement the Betuweroute increased by including the project in 
the agreement of Warnemünde
Organisational path dependence Agreements 1 0 1 1
10 At the time of decision-making in 1996, the available information was sufficient to 
take a well-advised decision
Project Information quality − 2 3 0 2
11 The decision to build was rather a strategic decision than a decision based on eco-
nomic or environmental objectives
Social External justification − 1 1 3 3
12 I felt I had to justify the decision for the Betuweroute to a larger extent than for other 
decisions
Psychological Internal justification − 2 0 − 1 − 1
13 The many informal promises (made by politicians, ministers etc.) made it impossible 
in 1996 to take a negative decision regarding the Betuweroute
Organisational path dependence Agreements 0 − 3 − 1 1
14 At the time of decision-making in 1996, the Betuweroute was the best solution for the 
problems with the freight transport









Table 2  (continued)
Nos. Statement Category of determinant Determinant Factor
A B C D
15 Pressure was put on individuals within political parties to support the Betuweroute 
project
Structural Political support 2 − 1 0 0
16 The underpinning of the necessity of the Betuweroute was improved due to social 
pressures in the period before the decision to build in 1996
Social Resistance 1 2 1 − 1
17 The perseverance of decision-makers towards the project was so large that there was 
no other option than to continue
Awareness Recognition 2 − 2 − 1 − 2
18 At the time of decision-making in 1996, the underpinnings for the utility and neces-
sity of the Betuweroute were sufficient
Project Information quality − 1 3 − 2 − 3
19 Critiques from society in the period before the decision to build in 1996 led to a 
decrease of support of the decision
Social Resistance 0 2 1 2
20 The solution in the form of the Betuweroute project was the starting point of discus-
sion rather than the problems for which the Betuweroute would serve as a solution




Participants in this category believe that the project was the starting point instead of the 
problems with inefficient capacity for freight transport (20:2). Alternatives were not given 
a fair chance (5:3). “Initiators were not interested in alternatives and there was a strong 
lobby for the Betuweroute project.” This illustrates how the preference for the project con-
tributed to lock-in. Individuals also considered political support to have played a role to 
some extent (15:2). “There was no unanimity within parties and agreement was enforced.” 
In addition, the information that was available at the time was not considered sufficient to 
make a well-advised decision (10: -2). However, participants dismiss self-justification as 
a cause of lock-in (8: -3, 12: -2). The participants clearly show some level of regret over 
previous options not being taking, suggesting risk-averse decision-makers. They assessed 
the risk of lock-in mostly through the determinants expressed preference, political support, 
and information quality. The participants are experienced decision-makers (8–14 years in 
ruling Cabinets) from different political parties in coalition and opposition.
Perception B
According to participants in this category expressed preference (20: -1) did not play a 
role, rather alternatives were considered to be inferior to the Betuweroute. “The choice 
for the Betuweroute was inevitable to reduce freight traffic by road. Inland shipping did 
not have the necessary potential.” Subjects deemed the available information sufficient to 
make a justified decision (10:3); “more information would not have led to a different deci-
sion.” The need for the project was proven (18:3). “The necessity of the Betuweroute was 
clear; information was mainly needed for the implementation.” Besides, psychological and 
social determinants were also dismissed as having contributed to lock-in. The participants 
do not support any determinants resulting in lock-in and as such they do not acknowledge 
the risk of lock-in. They could be considered risk-seeking as they have no apparent regret 
over decisions taken or previous options available. The participants sharing this perception 
are all males, with an average experience of 10 years covering three Cabinet periods. All 
except one represent coalition political parties.
Perception C
Participants that share this viewpoint believe that the economic and environmental justi-
fication for the project was weak (11:3). Subjects quite strongly believe alternatives were 
considered (5: -3). “Alternatives were discussed extensively but I am convinced they did 
not suffice.” This suggests a level of regret over the robustness of previous analyses but it 
also displays some level of minimax behaviour in that participants believed that putting the 
project in the policy plans gave it a favourable position over other projects (4:2). Similarly, 
subjects accepted that the lack of information could have influenced the project planning 
(18: -2) and that investments were too large to withdraw the project (7:2). Participants that 
share this perception feel some level of regret and can be considered risk-averse. They con-
sider the risk of lock-in mostly due to the role information quality and sunk costs. The par-
ticipants are varied across gender and experience. They represents different political parties 




All subjects in this category believe there was a clear preference for the project (20:2) and 
have some regret that potential feasible alternatives such as inland shipping were not given 
a fair evaluation. “The Betuweroute was a project of prestige.” “The Betuweroute had to be 
implemented no matter what. It was only a strategic project to strengthen the image of the 
Harbour of Rotterdam.” This suggests external justification played a role (11:3). Further-
more, subjects do not believe that the utility and necessity of the project was sufficiently 
examined (18: -3). “The financial arguments were flawed.” Agreements are considered to 
have played a minor role in the creation of lock-in whereas psychological determinants 
were generally dismissed. The clear feeling of regret shown by these participants suggests 
they are risk-averse. Their risk preference is mostly shaped by their attitude towards the 
role of expressed preference, external justification, closure of alternatives, agreements, and 
decision support in the formation of lock-in. Participants sharing this perception are expe-
rienced decision-makers (8–9 years covering at least two Cabinet periods). They represent 
different political parties mostly opposition parties.
Discussion and implications
Decision‑makers’ perceptions of the risk of lock‑in
Risk perception of lock-in formed by escalation of commitment. Participants in this study 
perceived project determinants as most influential in the risk of lock-in. Yet there is a lack 
of consensus about the contribution of information quality on the formation of lock-in. 
This opposing view can be explained by the concept of contested information, information 
that is “controversial, disputable, difficult to measure objectively or even non-existent” (De 
Bruijn and Leijten 2007: 50–51). Decision-makers disputed whether information was suf-
ficient to take a decision, whereby those who believed information was sufficient, may have 
been selective in using only information that fitted their beliefs.
Some decision-makers identified expressed preference for the project plan as a key 
determinant of lock-in. This is a common problem with (major) projects when project pro-
posals are taken as a starting point rather than selected as the result of a thorough problem 
analysis comparing different project options (Giezen 2013).
Risk perception of lock‑in formed by path dependence
We found that if decision-makers perceive a situation positively and hence support the 
decision, they are less likely to perceive lock-in as a risk. Confirmation bias may explain 
the relation between decision support and lock-in. It is “the tendency to search for, inter-
pret, favour, and recall information in a way that confirms one’s pre-existing beliefs” (Plous 
1993: 233). This implies decision-makers who support the decision are less critical and 
tend to use information that fits their (positive) viewpoint of the decision and consequently 
are more vulnerable to lock-in. Conversely, decision-makers who were critical towards 
the project decision perceived the risk of lock-in to be higher. This complements the find-
ings of previous studies. For instance, Wong (2005) found that when individuals perceive 
a situation as negative they will be more risk-averse and less likely to continue with that 
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decision path. Besides decision support, the closure of alternatives played a large role in 
the way in which decision-makers perceived the risk of lock-in whereas agreements had 
little contribution.
Relation between escalation of commitment and path dependency determinants
The findings reveal some interplay between the escalation of commitment and path 
dependency determinants. Figure 4 shows the updated model and relations as perceived by 
decision-makers in this study.
First of all there is a clear relation between decision support and closure of alternatives. 
Participants who supported the project decision generally did not acknowledge the role of 
closure of alternatives. Considering the relation between closure of alternatives and the 
escalation of commitment determinants, there is a clear relation with expressed preference 
although we cannot test for the causality of the relation. Participants who agreed that clo-
sure of alternatives played a role also believe expressed preferences played a role, and vice 
versa. There is also a relation with political support; people agreeing closure of alternatives 
played a role also believed political support contributed to this. However, the result should 
be approached with caution as decision-makers did not have strong opinions about this 
determinant.
There is some interplay between the external justification and resistance determinants 
and closure of alternatives. For example, the results showed a negative relation between 
closure of alternatives and improved underpinning of the project; decision-makers who 
acknowledged closure of alternatives also believed the underpinning for the project had not 
improved.
There seems to be a negative relation between sunk costs and closure of alternatives, 
participants either attributed the lock-in process to closure of alternatives or to sunk costs, 
but not a combination of both determinants.
The data did not provide evidence for any relation between self-justification and closure 
of alternatives, possibly because self-justification was generally dismissed as a determi-
nant. Lastly, the data could not confirm or dismiss a relation between agreements as a path 
dependency determinant and any of the escalation of commitment determinants because 
participants did not have a clear view about the role of agreements in the formation of 
lock-in.




Recognition of lock-in. From the discussion above we can conclude that many deter-
minants were not acknowledged by decision-makers, illustrating that they do not fully 
recognise the risk of lock-in. Another way to examine decision-makers perception of 
the risk of lock-in is by considering the extent to which they are aware that lock-in 
occurred and resulted in irreversibility of the project decision. This study revealed both 
decision-makers who were aware as well as decision-makers who were unaware of the 
lock-in process. This confirms previous studies into risk awareness such as Cantarelli 
et al. (2010) who differentiate between conscious and unconscious lock-in. Moreover, 
the awareness of lock-in is also present in situations characterised by warranted con-
tinuation. Decision-makers who were aware of lock-in believed that even though a for-
mal decision had not yet taken place, it was no longer possible to reverse the project 
decision.
Implications
This study has shown that decision-makers in three of the four perceptions on the risk of 
lock-in were to some extent risk-averse. Minimax regret theory suggests risk averseness 
will increase the level of regret of missing out on possible alternative projects and hence 
decision-makers would choose to withdraw from the project decision to minimise their 
extent of regret. However, this study has shown that this has actually not occurred and it 
can be argued that the level of decision-makers’ risk aversion was not sufficiently acute to 
drive the level of regret needed to take the decision to withdraw the project plan.
In fact, the level of risk averseness is moderated because most decision-makers do not 
fully recognise how lock-in emerges in the planning of projects and as such fail to recog-
nise the significance of the lock-in risk. They either do not notice determinants causing 
lock-in or they may not affiliate certain determinants to lock-in formation. This finding fits 
with current literature which points towards an inverse relation between problem recogni-
tion and lock-in (Keil, Depledge and Rai 2007).
The findings imply that when decision-makers do not fully assess the risk of lock-in 
they are more vulnerable to either escalate their commitment to a project decision (Nathan-
son et al. 1982; Jani 2011) or incrementally reinforce a decision path towards a set lock-in 
outcome. It shows how decision-makers’ perceptions of lock-in are a mediating factor in 
the formation of lock-in; underestimation of lock-in risk would increase likelihood of per-
sistence (Keil et al. 2000; Kahneman and Tversky 1979).
The underestimation of the risk of lock-in may point to honest ignorance but it may 
also be the result of strategic behaviour, that is intentionally underestimating the risk of 
lock-in when decision-makers have an interest in seeing the project realised (intentional 
lock-in) (Cantarelli et  al. 2010). Similar to Sydow et  al. (2010: 175) path development 
involves “mindful actions of agents who may or may not purposively plan for path depend-
ence”. Strategic behaviour can influence the formation of lock-in via escalation of com-
mitment tendency through the misrepresentation of project’s costs and benefits (Flyvbjerg 
et al. 2003; Winch 2013). It can influence the path dependence process by the tendency of 
decision-makers to make agreements in line with the expected (preferred) path/decision 




The finding that lock-in already occurs in the front-end phase is important for decision-
makers and stakeholders because it shows that measures should be put in place to avoid 
and mitigate the risk of lock-in much earlier than so far has been done. Most strategies to 
deal with lock-in are focused on the implementation phase and consequently will not be 
effective to deal with the different nature of lock-in in the front-end. Moreover, adopting a 
path creating strategy whereby decision-makers collaborate to deviate from the inefficient 
path has been proven to be effective (Garud and Karnoe 2001). However, our study showed 
that decision-makers often do not realise the current or planned decision path is inferior to 
potential others, hence such a strategy would not be adopted or it would not be effectively 
utilised, as its need is not recognised. This study thus illustrates the need for decision-mak-
ers to be alerted to the risk of lock-in and its consequences. It is only when decision-mak-
ers perceive the risk of lock-in, that they are more likely to be discouraged to persist with 
a course of action (Schaubroeck and Davis 1994; Drummond 2017). Only then will meas-
ures put in place to eliminate lock-in become fully effective (Hammond et al. 1998; Drum-
mond 2014). In addition, there is a need to amend decision-making and planning processes 
to include checkpoints that ensure the process is not liable to lock-in developments. These 
could be part of the quality assurance checkpoints such as those seen in the Norwegian 
Governance regime or the quality assurance review process in the Governance model of 
the UK (Volden and Samset 2017). Outsiders, people not associated with the project in any 
way, are recommended for this evaluation. Acknowledging some of the problems that may 
arise with the involvement of outsiders (Pinto 2019), outsiders are generally better able to 
objectively assess risks compared to insiders because they do not have attachment to the 
project or the decision-making process (Keil et al. 2008).
Limitations and future research
This study has focused on determinants previously identified in the literature and it was not 
the intention to identify new determinants. Rather, this paper aimed to illustrate that the 
temporal ordering of determinants already exist in the front-end phase before the decision 
is made to implement a project. Future research is recommended to identify possible new 
lock-in determinants in the front-end phase such as the influence of stakeholders’ attrib-
utes of power, urgency and legitimacy on the formation of lock-in. Moreover, our study 
showed some first indications of the interplay between the escalation of commitment and 
path dependency determinants. However, future research is recommended to explore and 
validate these relations in other settings.
The result of a Q-methodology study reveals the perspectives on an issue but it does 
not show how widely held these perspectives are in a population (McKeown and Thomas 
1988; Webler et al. 2009). It does not generate results that can be generalised to the entire 
population (McKeown and Thomas 1988), in our case to all relevant decision-makers on 
the Betuweroute. The value of Q-methodology lies in revealing the underlying viewpoints 
(by the extracted factors) on a particular topic, and these do not occur beyond the immedi-
ate set of participants. Generalisation in Q-methodology studies occurs at the level of the 
set of participants (Valenta and Wigger 1997) whereby each of the extracted factors is a 
generalisation of the viewpoint held by the persons that define them (Dryzek 2005). In our 
study the four factors that have been extracted are generalisations of the way of thinking 
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about the risk of lock-in in the Betuweroute project. Future research is recommended into 
the perceived risk of lock-in in other projects and the prevalence of viewpoints on lock-in 
risk among the larger population of decision-makers by conducting large group surveys 
(Valenta and Wigger 1997).
Considering our finding of perceived risk as a contributing determinant in the forma-
tion of lock-in, we recommend to carry out further research into this new determinant, for 
example extended research into the relative strength of contributing determinants and how 
the risk of lock-in is perceived in other phases of the project life cycle.
Conclusion
This study makes two main contributions to the current knowledge on lock-in in major 
transportation projects. First, we have identified several escalation and path depend-
ency determinants that may result in lock-in in the front-end phase of major transpor-
tation projects, a phase that is not yet clearly understood in the escalation of commit-
ment and project management disciplines (He and Mittal 2007; Williams et al. 2019). 
Relevant escalation of commitment determinants include expressed preference, need 
for justification, sunk costs, external justification, resistance, and political support. 
Relevant path dependency determinants include closure of alternatives, agreements, 
and decision support. Moreover, the study also provided some first insights into the 
interaction between escalation of commitment and path dependency determinants. Par-
ticularly there is a strong influence between the path dependency determinants decision 
support and closure of alternatives. There are also various relations between closure of 
alternatives and the following escalation of commitment determinants: expressed pref-
erence, sunk costs, external justification, resistance and political support. As such we 
provide a more comprehensive understanding of lock-in formation and show the need 
to extend the theoretical model of lock-in to include the front-end phase.
Secondly, we have shown that risk attitudes vary across decision-makers depending on 
their perception of the determinants that causes this lock-in and the extent to which they 
recognise the risk of becoming locked-in to a project decision-making path. According to 
the decision-makers, the most influential determinants in the formation of lock-in include 
expressed preference, information quality, decision support and closure of alternatives. In 
contrast, need for justification and agreements did not contribute to lock-in. The extent to 
which decision-makers recognised determinants distinguished the four perceptions of the 
risk of lock-in.
This study illustrates the need to include risk perception as an additional determinant in 
the framework of lock-in. We have shown that underestimating the risk of lock-in may con-









Table 3  Statement and link with determinants
Statement Category of determinant Determinant Nos.
The commitment to implement the Betuweroute increased by including the project in the policy plan 
SVV2
Project Expressed preference 4
The solution in the form of the Betuweroute project was the starting point of discussion rather than the 
problems for which the Betuweroute would serve as a solution
Project Expressed preference 20
At the time of decision-making in 1996, the underpinnings for the utility and necessity of the Betuweroute 
were sufficient
Project Information quality 18
At the time of decision-making in 1996, the available information was sufficient to take a well-advised 
decision
Project Information quality 10
I would have taken it personally if the decision to build Betuweroute project had not passed Psychological Internal justification 8
I felt I had to justify the decision for the Betuweroute to a larger extent than for other decisions Psychological Internal justification 12
Although the decision was not yet taken formally, the immense amount of time put in the project before 
1996 made it impossible not to proceed with the project
Psychological Sunk costs 2
Even before the formal decision to build was taken in 1996, investments (for amongst other research) were 
too large to blow off the project
Psychological Sunk costs 7
In their position towards the Betuweroute, some politicians put their personal interest before social or 
economic interests
Social External justification 3
The decision to build was rather a strategic decision than a decision based on economic or environmental 
objectives
Social External justification 11
The underpinning of the necessity of the Betuweroute was improved due to social pressures in the period 
before the decision to build in 1996
Social Resistance 16
Critiques from society in the period before the decision to build in 1996 led to a decrease of support of the 
decision
Social Resistance 19
Pressure was put on individuals within political parties to support the Betuweroute project Structural Political support 15
I felt like alternatives for the Betuweroute (for example inland shipping) could not be discussed Organisational path dependence Closure of alternatives 5
The commitment to implement the Betuweroute increased by including the project in the agreement of 
Warnemünde
Organisational path dependence Agreements 9
The many informal promises (made by politicians, ministers etc.) made it impossible in 1996 to take a 
negative decision regarding the Betuweroute









Table 3  (continued)
Statement Category of determinant Determinant Nos.
At the time of decision-making in 1996, the Betuweroute was the best solution for the problems with the 
freight transport
Organisational path dependence Decision support 14
In 1996, the decision to build was taken, but informally, one or more political parties had already commit-
ted themselves to the project
Awareness Recognition 1
In 1996 the decision to build was taken, but I felt committed to the project much earlier Awareness Recognition 6







Table 3 shows the statements and their relation with the determinant of lock-in. The cate-
gory of determinant refers to any of the four categories of escalation of commitment, organ-
isational path dependency, or awareness. The statements have been randomly numbered.
Appendix 2
Figure 5 shows how a hypothetical person with a 100 percent loading on factor A would 
have rank ordered the 20 statements.
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